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Abstract 
We propose a novel account of the distinction between innate and acquired biological traits: 
biological traits are innate to the degree that they are caused by factors intrinsic to the organism 
at the time of its origin; they are acquired to the degree that they are caused by factors extrinsic 
to the organism. This account borrows from recent work on causation in order to make rigorous 
the notion of quantitative contributions to traits by different factors in development. We avoid 
the pitfalls of previous accounts and argue that the distinction between innate and acquired traits 
is scientifically useful. We therefore address not only previous accounts of innateness but also 
skeptics about any account. The two are linked, in that a better account of innateness also enables 
us better to address the skeptics. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Scientists find it useful to divide biological traits into innate and acquired ones.
2
 But it is now a 
commonplace that biological traits result from the complex interplay of genetic and 
environmental factors. Therefore, they cannot be labeled innate or acquired simpliciter; a more 
sophisticated analysis is required.  
 
We will argue that biological traits are innate to the degree that they are caused by factors 
intrinsic to the organism at the time of its origin, while they are acquired to the degree that they 
are caused by factors extrinsic to the organism. We will ground this account in a rigorous notion 
of degree of causation. We will then compare it with previous accounts. After that, we will 
address skepticism about innateness and argue that the concept remains valuable. 
 
Our account explicates ‘innate’ and ‘acquired’ to fit clear uses of these terms within the 
biological sciences. These uses are informed by the sciences of evolution and development. We 
appeal to judgments about what’s innate and acquired that should be uncontroversial, upon 
reflection, among subjects educated in current biology. To the degree that our account departs 
from untutored judgments (Griffiths et al. 2009), such judgments ought to be revised—as even 
non-scientists are capable of doing (Knobe and Samuels 2013). 
 
 
2. Intrinsic Factors at the Time of Origin 
To motivate our account, let’s begin with two popular yet inadequate explications of innateness. 
First, innateness cannot be what’s genetic or caused by genes because being caused by genes is 
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neither necessary nor sufficient for being innate. Some innate factors are not genetic, such as 
mitochondria, the cytoplasm, and inherited epigenetic factors. And some genetic factors are not 
innate, such as genes inserted into an organism via genetic engineering or bacterial conjugation. 
Second, innateness cannot be the same as what’s inherited. Some innate factors are not inherited, 
such as mutations, while some inherited factors are not innate (Mameli 2004). 
 
There is something in the vicinity of the genome and inherited factors that will help us develop a 
better account: it is the factors that are intrinsic to an organism at the time it originates. 
Organisms originate either through synthesis of non-living materials or through reproduction, 
either sexual or asexual. In sexually reproducing organisms, new individuals originate at the time 
of conception. In asexually reproducing organisms, new individuals originate at the time of 
fission or cloning.
3
  
 
We will appeal to the factors that are intrinsic to an organism at the time it originates as a distinct 
individual. By intrinsic factors, we mean properties that organisms have in virtue of what’s 
within their boundaries. For ease of reference, we will refer to these factors as Intrinsic Factors at 
Origin (IFOs).
4
 IFOs include the cell membrane and any factor that is included within the cell 
membrane, such as the genome, epigenetic factors, mitochondria, or the cytoplasm. IFOs exclude 
any factors that are in the environment of, and thus external to, the new biological individual.  
The same IFOs may give rise to different phenotypes depending on differences in environment. 
By the same token, a given environment may give rise to different phenotypes depending on 
which specific IFOs interact with it. 
 
The first step in our account is that IFOs are innate. This stipulation is consistent with common 
usage. Any causal contributions to the phenotype that are not from IFOs, and hence are extrinsic 
to the organism, are environmental. Traits that were not present at origin are the effect of the 
interplay between IFOs and environmental causes. These latter traits are innate to the degree that 
they are caused by IFOs as opposed to environmental factors; acquired to the degree that they are 
caused by environmental factors as opposed to IFOs.  
 
 
3. Degree of Causal Contribution 
At the heart of the common interest in innateness is the efficacy of interventions. Intuitively, a 
trait is acquired to the degree that intervening on its developmental environment changes it; it is 
innate to the complementary degree that intervening on its developmental environment leaves it 
unchanged. This is what our analysis is after. Already, this coheres with deeming IFOs 
themselves to be innate: interventions on IFOs will (trivially) have an effect on IFOs, but 
interventions on environment will have zero effect on IFOs because any environmental 
intervention can by definition only occur after an organism’s origin.  
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The notion of an intervention is in turn intimately tied to that of causation. It is not a coincidence, 
therefore, that causal notions such as contribution and sensitivity will prove central to innateness. 
Indeed, we will define innateness in explicitly causal terms. This approach has several 
advantages: it can be anchored in the rich causation literature, it will always be readily 
applicable, and it enforces conceptual clarity. Notably, it will make clear just how much, and 
why, ascriptions of innateness and related terms are relative to explanatory context. 
 
We have demarcated the factors that determine a trait’s development into two subsets, namely, 
IFOs and environment. These are the relevant causes; the trait itself is the relevant effect. So 
armed, we may proceed.  
 
The heart of our analysis is degree of causal contribution. Overwhelmingly, this notion has been 
analyzed in philosophy of science and metaphysics as degree of difference making. Roughly 
speaking, a cause’s contribution is defined as how much difference it makes to an effect. More 
formally: Let X be a cause variable and Y an effect variable. Y is a function of the state of the 
world—i.e., of X and W—where W is background conditions (i.e., formally a set of variables 
representing the state of the world just excluding X). In causal graph terms, there are arrows into 
Y from both X and W. Let XA denote the actual value of X, let XC denote the salient 
counterfactual value of X, and let YA and YC denote the values that Y takes given XA and XC 
respectively. Then define the degree of causal contribution of a cause variable X with respect to 
an effect variable Y, to be: YA – YC.
5
 We gloss over many further technical details here 
(Northcott 2013, 2012b).  
 
Degree of causal contribution is thus a fundamentally comparative notion: what is the value of an 
effect variable with a cause compared to its value without that cause? A cause’s degree of 
contribution is therefore multiply relativized. 
 
First, degree of contribution will depend on the salient contrast level or levels of the cause 
variable. For example, a particular allele might be an important (probabilistic) cause of 
schizophrenia relative to some contrast allele – but only a minor one relative to a different 
contrast allele. The contribution of a particular cause, such as a particular IFO, is not well 
defined until we have further specified a salient contrast. Thus, the same actual IFO may be 
associated with many different degrees of causal contribution, depending on choice of contrast 
IFOs. The same applies to the contribution of a particular environment. 
 
Second, even given a specified contrast, causal contribution will also vary with background 
conditions, i.e., with the value of non-focal IFOs or environmental variables. Take the prevailing 
cultural environment, for instance: perhaps in the stress of a modern city a particular allele 
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greatly raises the chance of developing schizophrenia, yet in hunter-gatherer conditions it has 
almost no effect.
 
 
 
Third, causal contribution is also relative to choice of effect variable – in two ways. First, 
obviously, something may make a big difference to one thing but none at all to another. Second, 
less obviously, choice of contrast value of the effect variable is in general significant for 
assessing a cause’s explanatory strength (Northcott 2013). 
 
 
4. Innateness 
Several notions of innateness arise. The simplest concerns a single trait of an individual, as when 
we declare your eye color to be innate. A second notion concerns a trait type within a population, 
as when we declare human eye color in general to be innate. A third concerns the more abstract 
notion of sensitivity, as when a trait’s development is declared to be insensitive to environmental 
influence. A fourth concerns the range of values a trait may take, as when we say that a trait’s 
development is ‘under a tight leash’. At first glance, these various senses may seem 
heterogeneous. Upon closer examination, they are different manifestations of degree of causal 
contribution. We will now clarify and unify them under a common framework. 
 
4.1 Contribution – token case 
Consider the trait of height. For simplicity, let’s pretend that the only relevant environmental 
factor is diet. Consider an animal population, its range of heights, and its range of diets. The 
different phenotypes (heights) are not just an unanalyzable mix of IFOs and environmental 
contributions. On the contrary, for any given IFOs there is a range of possible heights and the 
same for any given diet. The specific height of any individual is the outcome generated when 
that individual’s IFOs are exposed to that individual’s diet. Our suggestion is to call the effects 
on height coming from IFOs the innate contribution to height, and the effects on height coming 
from diet the acquired contribution to height. 
 
In making this suggestion more precise, it will help to tackle the token and type cases separately. 
Begin with the token case. Formally, denote the relevant effect variable by T. This may be some 
quantitative variable such as height or qualitative one such as eye color. As we will see, what 
exactly T denotes may be interpreted with considerable flexibility. T’s value is a function of its 
causes. In particular, for our purposes we partition these causes into two groups, namely IFOs 
and environment E. Then, following the causal analysis from the previous section, the quantity 
of contribution of IFOs to T is defined as follows: 
 
 T(IFO, E) – T(IFO*, E) (1) 
 
The asterisk denotes the salient contrast IFOs. We may define the contribution of environment 
similarly, with some contrast E* instead of IFO* in the right-hand side of the formula. 
 
In the height example, in the token case (of you, say) the effect variable T is your height. The 
two causes of interest are a specific IFO—the subset of your IFOs that is relevant to height—and 
diet. What would your height have been if you’d had your friend’s IFO instead of your own – 
and, thus, how much difference did having your IFO make? The answer to that is, per formula 
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(1), your IFO’s causal contribution. And similarly for the causal contribution of diet. The 
counterfactuals are evaluated like all causal counterfactuals, i.e., by keeping background 
conditions constant except for changes caused by the change of IFOs itself (Lewis 1973, 
Woodward 2003). 
 
Two important corollaries follow. First, degrees of contribution by either IFO or diet are relative 
both to choice of contrast and to background conditions.
6
 Thus, my IFO might make a large 
difference to my height compared to one friend’s IFO but not compared to another’s, and a large 
difference to my height in one environment but not in another. Therefore, innateness itself is also 
a relative rather than absolute matter. 
 
Second, the contributions of IFO and environment need not ‘add up’ to a trait’s whole value. 
Suppose, for instance, that my height is 2 meters. If the contrast IFO would have seen my height 
be 1.8 m, then the causal contribution of my IFO is 0.2 m. Similarly, if the contrast diet is 
identical to my actual one save that it included less protein, then relative to that my actual diet 
perhaps only contributed 0.1 m. And 0.1 + 0.2 < 2. For some choices of contrasts the two 
contributions might add up to exactly 2, but in general they will not. Once we accept the first 
corollary that causal contribution is a relative matter, this second corollary is inevitable.
7
 
 
Another important point is that the ubiquitous causal entanglement of IFOs and environmental 
factors does not present any particular analytical difficulty. In the same way that counterfactuals 
generally are definable, so is the causal contribution of either IFOs or environment (Northcott 
2012b) – against the skepticism of, for instance, Ariew (1996) and Garson (2015, 83). 
 
4.2 Quantity of contribution – type case 
In the type case the issue becomes, what is the contribution of IFOs to the height of a 
population’s members as opposed to the height of a particular organism? Formally, in (1) the 
interpretation of T must be adjusted accordingly. It will be some measure of the height of a 
population – we must choose between mean, variance, or something else. There is now a richer 
range of possible contrasts. Are we comparing human heights or those of other species? If only 
human heights, which particular human populations? Suppose we are interested in height in a 
contemporary Western population; that still leaves open whether we are comparing this to non-
Western populations, to counterfactual populations (perhaps some hypothetical enhanced human 
population of the future), to past populations, or to other contemporary Western populations. 
Formally, each such choice implies a commitment to some particular set and contrast set of 
IFOs, and any value for IFOs’ causal contribution to height will vary accordingly. Analogous 
remarks apply to the type-level causal contribution of environmental factors. 
 
All this duly noted, the type-level contribution of IFOs to height is defined, per (1), as how much 
difference the actual range of IFOs makes relative to some contrast range of IFOs. 
 
But yet more disambiguation is required. First, the interpretation of ‘contrast range of IFOs’ is 
underdetermined. Suppose, for instance, it is taken to be the population of some currently poorer 
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country. What then would the contrast background conditions, such as diet, correspond to? We 
would want in the usual way the contrast population’s diet to be the same as the actual 
population’s diet. Would the diet and background conditions experienced by ‘Person 1’ in the 
actual population be exactly that experienced by ‘Person 1’ in the contrast population, and 
likewise for all other persons? The designation of who in the contrast population would be 
‘Person 1’ is arbitrary and yet will impact the value assigned to the causal contribution, given the 
ubiquity of interactive effects, i.e., that different individuals’ heights in general respond 
differently to the same change in diet. 
 
What of causal contribution within a single population? Many different token-level contributions 
are definable, corresponding to different pairs, both actual and counterfactual, of members of the 
population, and for each pair there is a range of possible background environments. Any overall 
score for the population as a whole must presumably then be some aggregate of these token 
scores. Which particular aggregate is most appropriate is again interest-relative.
8
 
 
We list these intricacies in order to emphasize again that any type-level score for causal 
contribution, and thus any ascription of innateness, is relativized in many ways. But we are not 
implying that type-level innateness is therefore so underspecified as to be useless. Quite the 
opposite. Consider degree of causation in general: even though multiply relativized in the same 
way, it is very useful. In practice, the explanatory context usually makes sufficiently clear what 
the relevant relativizations are, and they can always be noted explicitly if necessary. 
Accordingly, it can be meaningful to claim, and useful to know, that, for instance, smoking is a 
stronger cause of lung cancer than is air pollution. There is no reason why we cannot establish 
similarly useful claims about causal contributions to the development of a biological trait – 
indeed lung cancer itself is one example. 
 
4.3 Sensitivity 
Turn next to what initially seems a rather different notion of innateness. As a first pass—and 
assuming a discrete trait and a linear interaction between IFOs and environments—on this 
alternative view, the degree of innateness is the proportion of environments (relative to the entire 
environmental range of interest) in which a trait manifests itself given certain IFOs rather than 
others. Similarly, the degree of acquiredness is the proportion of IFOs (from the range of 
interest) that give rise to a trait within a certain kind of environment rather than others.  
 
As it stands, this approach is incomplete because it does not specify that the range of 
environments of interest must include non-actual ones. For example, the belief that we cannot 
breathe under water arises in almost all actual environments for almost all human IFOs, and 
accordingly would be awarded a high degree of innateness. But, of course, this belief is a 
paradigm case of something acquired. The reason is that typically we consider those 
counterfactual scenarios where a human never experiences enough water to worry about 
breathing in it nor is she ever taught about it. Focusing only on actual cases obscures this 
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dependence on environment. The remedy is to include some non-actual cases too by analyzing 
innateness in terms of the causal notion of sensitivity. 
 
So, in a more refined version, the more a trait is sensitive to variation in IFOs and insensitive to 
environmental variations (within the relevant ranges), the more innate it is. Conversely, the more 
a trait is insensitive to variation in IFOs and sensitive to environmental variations, the more 
acquired it is. If a trait is completely insensitive to environmental variation (within the relevant 
range), it is innate simpliciter. If a trait is completely insensitive to variation in IFOs (within the 
relevant range), it is acquired simpliciter. 
 
An example: Down syndrome occurs when people have a particular extra chromosome, pretty 
much regardless of environment (within any range that will normally be relevant). And similarly 
for other so-called genetic conditions. These traits are therefore innate, even though there may 
well be special environments in which they do not develop or they develop in milder forms, and 
of course medical researchers ought to investigate and design such special environments. (The 
absence of Down syndrome symptoms in a hypothetical environment that is specifically 
designed to prevent its development in people with the extra chromosome, then, would be an 
acquired trait.) Similarly, calluses and scars occur when certain environmental interventions 
affect people’s skin, pretty much regardless of what someone’s IFOs are (within a normal range). 
These traits are therefore acquired, even though there may well be rare IFOs that prevent their 
occurrence, and it may well be important to investigate those rare IFOs. (The absence of calluses 
and scars under the relevant environmental conditions, then, would be an innate trait.) 
 
The sensitivity of a trait is connected to causal contribution, but how exactly? Recall that token-
level degree of contribution, per (1), is the impact of a single intervention on a trait of a single 
organism. Next, type-level degree of contribution is defined in the same way, i.e. per (1), except 
it tracks the impact of an intervention on a trait in general. This is a function of many token-level 
degrees of contribution. The sensitivity understanding of innateness now expands still further the 
degrees of contribution taken into account. In particular, not only do we consider a range of 
organisms as in the type-level contribution, but we also consider a range of interventions too. 
Sensitivity amounts to some function of different interventions’ own type-level contributions, 
each of these type-level contributions defined per (1). A trait’s sensitivity to variation in IFOs is 
understood as the extent to which changes in IFOs produce change in the trait.
9
 Similarly, a 
trait’s insensitivity to environment is understood as the extent to which changes in environment 
do not produce change in a trait. There is also no reason why sensitivity cannot be defined at the 
token level too, i.e. for an individual organism’s trait. 
 
This sensitivity notion of innateness is thus a relativized affair in the same way as causal 
contribution is. There exists no univocal degree of sensitivity for any given trait; rather, all 
depends on choices of contrasts and background conditions.
10
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4.4 Innate range 
The range of values that a trait can have for any given IFO in a certain range of environments is 
that trait’s innate range for that IFO. The range of values that a trait can have in a certain 
environment given a certain range of IFOs is that trait’s innate range for that environment. The 
idea here is that both environments and IFOs constrain the value that a trait may take, and it’s 
often useful to know by how much. Contributions of IFOs and environments to a trait, as well as 
innate ranges, can be plotted on a chart with either IFOs or environments as the independent 
variable (Figures 1&2). The implicit notion of innateness is that the more the range of values is 
constrained by a given IFO, the more innate that trait is.
11
 
 
 [Insert Figures 1&2 here] 
 
How does this version of innateness relate to the base notion of degree of causal contribution, as 
defined by (1)? Suppose we wish to know how strongly my IFOs constrain my height. This 
corresponds to T being the trait of height, IFOs being fixed at their actual value, and an interest 
in how T varies as environment varies across some salient range. In other words, like the 
sensitivity understanding of innateness, the range understanding corresponds to a function of a 
particular group of causal contributions. Instead of perhaps the average value of these 
contributions (as in the case of sensitivity), in the case of range we might be interested rather in 
the difference between the greatest and smallest contributions.
12
 
 
Because of this underlying similarity to the other understandings of innateness, the range 
understanding shares the now familiar properties of being relativized to choice of contrasts and 
to background conditions. It also shares the appeal to counterfactuals, since many cited IFO-
environment pairs may not actually occur. 
 
 
5. Summary: an account of innateness 
We have defined innateness informally as follows: 
 
Base clause: intrinsic factors at origin (IFOs) are innate. 
Recursive clause: other traits are innate to the degree that they are caused by IFOs and 
not by environmental factors. 
 
We have defined acquiredness informally as follows: 
 
Traits are acquired to the degree that they are caused by environmental factors and not by 
IFOs. 
 
These definitions, we saw, can be developed in several ways. First, degree of causation may be 
explicated as what we called quantity of contribution. On this understanding, a trait is innate to 
the degree that IFOs make a large contribution to it and environmental factors make a small 
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contribution to it. On a second understanding, a trait is innate to the degree that it is sensitive to 
variations in IFOs and insensitive to environmental variations (within salient ranges). On a third 
understanding, a trait is innate to the degree that it has a small range of variation across salient 
environments (when holding IFOs fixed).
13
 All three of these come in type and token versions. 
(Mutatis mutandis for defining ‘acquired’.) 
 
When analyzed causally, the close relation between these different understandings becomes 
apparent. They are all variations on degree of causal contribution, as defined by formula (1). In 
particular, in all cases innateness is identified with a large causal contribution from IFOs and a 
small one from environment. This causal contribution may be at the token level, e.g. to an 
individual organism’s height, or at a type level, e.g. to a population of individuals’ heights. 
Further, it may be that we are interested in a range of causal contributions, i.e. in a range of 
contrast levels of IFOs or environments, not just one. A trait’s innate sensitivity is then the extent 
to which variation across this range of IFOs (or environments) produces large (or small) changes 
in the trait, i.e. it is some function of a range of causal contributions. A trait’s innate range, 
meanwhile, is a specific such function, namely the difference between the greatest and least trait 
values produced by the relevant range of IFOs or environments. 
 
Because they are all versions of degree of causal contribution, all of these understandings of 
innateness are multiply relativized and are a matter of degree. Moreover, they share two 
implications: first, the inefficacy of salient environmental interventions on highly innate traits; 
and second, a predictive guide as to what to expect to observe, and to be robust, across a range of 
environments. All also allow innateness to be readily measured, although how best to do so may 
be highly sensitive to local details (Griffiths et al. 2015). 
 
Our account easily explains why judgments of innateness often correlate with traits that are 
insensitive to environmental factors during development, are typical of a population, or are 
adaptations, and why environments that disrupt the development of innate traits are often judged 
to be abnormal (Griffiths et al. 2009). Insensitivity to environmental factors is a component of 
innateness that is built into our account. Being typical of a species is not a component of 
innateness; but traits that are typical of a species are often highly innate because members of a 
species share important aspects of their IFOs, and causation by shared IFOs is the simplest way 
to produce species-typical traits. Finally, being an adaptation is not a component of innateness; 
but adaptations are usually highly innate because selecting IFOs is the most common way that 
natural selection produces adaptations. Of course, adaptations are usually also typical of a 
species. In light of the above, many highly innate trait types are species-typical adaptations. And 
since adaptations contribute to fitness, environments that disrupt them disrupt fitness, which may 
lead to judgments that such environments are abnormal. 
 
So, on our account, innate traits do not necessarily have many of the properties often associated 
with innateness. They need not be species-typical, essential to a species, or adaptations. By the 
same token, acquired traits need not be learned. This independence from problematic 
associations will come in handy when we rebut skepticism about innateness. 
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A special caveat pertains to whether innate traits are present at birth. Etymologically, that is what 
‘innate’ means. But the term ‘innate’ is much older than our scientific understanding of how 
organisms originate. In past days, it might have made sense to focus on the traits that organisms 
possess at birth. For one thing, it was difficult if not impossible to study the development of traits 
before birth. For another thing, it was not always known that many organisms, such as bacteria, 
do not give birth in the sense in which animals do.  
 
The notion of innateness should be general enough to cover all organisms. That’s why we must 
focus on the traits that organisms possess at the time of origin and what those traits contribute to 
the development of other traits. Insofar as that’s not what innateness used to mean, it’s what it 
should mean. That being said, anyone who finds it useful to focus on the special case of traits 
that are present at birth, or at any other time in development, can easily adapt our account. They 
can define specialized notions of innateness as follows: a trait is innatet either if it is intrinsic to 
an organism at time t (where t = birth or any other salient time) or to the degree it is caused by 
traits that are intrinsic to an organism at time t. We will leave such specialized notions of 
innateness aside and focus on the basic case. 
 
Next, we will compare our approach to previous ones. We contend that it does better both at 
tracking scientifically informed judgments about innateness and at doing the jobs we need the 
innate/acquired distinction to do. After that, we will address arguments that advocate abandoning 
the notion of innateness altogether. 
 
 
6. Compare and Contrast  
We can now assess other recent proposals that are either accounts of or replacements for 
innateness. Our account is the first to articulate explicitly the separate notions of innate 
contribution, sensitivity to IFO variation, insensitivity to environmental variation, and innate 
range, as well as how they all stem from degree of causal contribution. 
 
The most influential previous account, by contrast, is that innateness is simply insensitivity to 
variations in the developmental environment (Ariew 1996, 1999; O’Neill 2015; see also Stich 
1975, Sober 1998).
14
 This core idea is indeed a condition that contributes to innateness—
accordingly, it is built into our account as a component of it. But this condition alone is not 
enough, for several reasons. For one thing, as well as insensitivity to environment, an account of 
innateness should also include the mirror notion of sensitivity to IFO, as when, say, eye color 
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produces “relatively few phenotypic outcomes” (Mallon and Weinberg 2006, 340). Yet polymorphic traits (e.g., 
human eye color), whose developmental process produces many phenotypic outcomes, may still be highly innate.  
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being innate implies that (in context) your and my different eye colors are due to our different 
IFOs.  
 
Another lacuna is the lack of a satisfactory account of degree of causal contribution. One 
symptom of this is inadequate appreciation of the crucial role of contrasts. Recent accounts have 
made innateness relative to a contrast class of outcomes (Birch 2009) or to a contrast class of 
environments (Ariew, O’Neill). But innateness is relative to contrasts in both cause and effect 
slots—relative both to contrast IFOs or environments and also to contrast trait values. This 
double-contrastivity proves useful in many examples in the literature, such as the birdsong cases 
discussed below. We also get clearer on a number of other issues: what other relativizations are 
necessary; how these relativizations are often not – and need not be – made explicit (see Section 
8 below and contrary to O’Neill’s account); the relevance of counterfactuals; the distinction 
between type and token cases; and that innateness must be a matter of degree (again contrary to 
O’Neill’s account, although not to Ariew’s). 
 
Another insensitivity account is Woodward’s suggestion that innateness is causation by genes 
that is insensitive to salient environmental variation (2006, 41-2). Although it is rather brief and 
suffers from some of the same lacunae as other insensitivity accounts, Woodward’s suggestion is 
closer to ours in that it is rooted in a contextual difference-making theory of causation. 
 
A different recent proposal is that the distinction between innate and acquired traits should be 
replaced by the distinction between robust and plastic traits (Bateson and Gluckman 2011; also 
Keller 2010, 75; Garson 2015, Section 4.5). A trait is robust to the extent that it appears reliably 
in the face of both environmental and genetic variation. Thus, robustness entails insensitivity to 
variations in the developmental environment but not vice versa. A trait is plastic to the extent 
that it’s not robust. Robustness and plasticity are also important notions; they point at the 
valuable project of investigating the mechanisms through which some traits can develop reliably 
through generations in spite of wide environmental and genetic variation. But this is clearly not 
the same as innateness, as traits can be innate without being robust. For example, a point 
mutation may lead to a trait that is innate yet not at all robust with respect to IFO variation. More 
generally, often innateness signals precisely that a trait is sensitive to genetic variation – it’s the 
IFOs, not the environment, that make the difference. So, the robust-plastic distinction is neither 
equivalent to nor a good replacement for the innate-acquired distinction. 
 
Wimsatt (1986, 1999) makes a sophisticated replacement proposal along related lines, namely 
that innateness should be replaced by generative entrenchment. A trait is generatively entrenched 
to the extent that the development of other traits depends on it. Because of this dependence, the 
more a trait is generatively entrenched, the more disrupting it would have widespread and 
potentially catastrophic consequences for other traits, and so the more it tends to be robust (so as 
to avoid these catastrophic consequences). An immediate counterexample is, as with the 
robustness account, a trait caused by a point mutation that may be innate yet not generatively 
entrenched. But Wimsatt’s proposal is part of a larger project concerning the evolution of 
phenotypic structure, because of which he is explicitly concerned only with traits that are 
species-typical. His account is not meant to be applicable to innate traits that vary within species, 
such as human eye color. Generative entrenchment is therefore not a perfect conceptual 
substitute for innateness, as Wimsatt is well aware. The real issue is whether those aspects of 
12 
 
innateness not captured by generative entrenchment are of value. Wimsatt argues that they are 
not. His position on innateness is thus one of partial skepticism. In the next two sections we will 
explain why we disagree. 
 
 
7. Against Innateness Skepticism I 
A large strand of the literature has treated the very notion of innateness with suspicion—the old 
labels of ‘innate’ and ‘acquired’ are said to have many liabilities. Innate traits were often 
assumed to be adaptations, species-typical, or present at birth, and acquired traits were often 
assumed to have the opposite characteristics. But innate traits need not be adaptations, species-
typical, or present at birth. More fundamentally, the innate/acquired dichotomy is accused of 
resting on an essential/inessential dichotomy, and evolutionary theory is taken to have fatally 
undermined essentialism about biological types. Accordingly, it is charged, any focus on 
innateness is scientifically unhelpful. It risks invoking misleading essentialist connotations, 
which leads to confusion by conflating various biological properties that are better kept separate 
(Griffiths 2002, Mameli & Bateson 2006, 2011). Moreover, these connotations may be harmful 
socially as well as scientifically, perhaps by stigmatizing members of atypical sub-groups or by 
entrenching culturally specific notions of humanness (Hull 1986, Sahlins 2008, Lloyd 2012). 
 
We will reply in two stages. First, in this section we argue that many of the most widespread 
criticisms do not apply to our account. Then, in the next section, we consider remaining 
criticisms that do apply and so require a longer response, including elaboration of the innateness 
concept’s positive value. 
 
The key is that, from the practical point of view of advice and interventions, often what matters 
is whether – not how – a trait’s development is sensitive to a particular variable of interest, be 
that variable an IFO or an environmental factor. Our account abstracts away from underlying 
biological mechanisms or evolutionary history. It therefore makes no appeal to the notion of an 
evolutionary adaptation, so it is left unscathed by the many cases of innate traits that are not 
adaptations. It is compatible with evolutionary histories of niche construction and more generally 
of continuous reciprocal interaction between genes and environment (Laland & Brown 2007). 
And it is compatible with evolution making development reliable by stabilizing environmental 
parameters at the right value or by exploiting pre-existing environmental regularities. 
 
It may be that universal (or almost universal) traits derive their relative stability across 
environments and cultures not solely from inherited genes but equally from extra-genetic 
influences. But again our account is compatible with this observation. For instance, if the 
explanatory context is the dependence of a trait’s universality on a particular environmental cue, 
then the salient contrast will be the absence of that cue, which in turn will generate a large causal 
contribution for environment, yielding a verdict of ‘acquired’. Thus, universality will not imply a 
verdict of ‘innate’ when the explanatory focus is the trait’s dependence on a particular 
environmental input. (When the focus is instead the inefficacy of some other environmental 
input, then the verdict of ‘innate’ usefully returns.)  
 
A related skeptical motivation draws on work by developmental psychobiologists suggesting that 
any trait is sensitive to various environmental cues. For example, one species of cowbird 
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acquires a species-typical song without exposure to parental singing, but with a regional dialect 
depending on its interaction with local females (see Griffiths 2009 for references). Our account, 
asserting as it does that traits are innate or acquired only relative to the range of environments 
that we consider, easily accommodates such complexities. Different explanatory contexts yield 
different innateness verdicts. If we are interested in why the bird sings its species-typical song 
rather than a song typical of another species, then IFOs make the difference but environment 
does not, thus yielding a verdict of ‘innate’. If, by contrast, we are interested in why the bird has 
this particular song dialect rather than another, then it is environment not IFOs that make the 
difference, thus yielding a verdict of ‘acquired’. That is, the song type is innate, the dialect 
acquired. (Formally, the two cases may be represented in (1) by different choices of contrast in 
both the effect and cause slots.) 
 
Making no appeal to the mechanism of learning, our account accommodates examples where 
innateness and (lack of) learning come apart. Mameli and Bateson (2011, 438) give a 
hypothetical such case: a bird has a species-typical song but developing the ability to sing it 
requires a learning process, so the trait seems innate even though it requires learning. But the 
correct account is that the anatomical structures required to sing the particular song type are 
highly innate, i.e., caused primarily by IFOs in a way that is insensitive to the learning input, 
while the ability to actually sing it is acquired in response to the learning input. It is to our 
account’s credit that it captures this distinction.15 
 
Another source of skepticism about innateness is the non-additive nature of gene-environment 
interactions during development, which allegedly makes it impossible to parcel out responsibility 
between the two factors in a meaningful way (Griffiths 2009). We agree that responsibility 
cannot be ‘parceled out’ in the sense that the two factors’ causal contributions may not add up to 
the total value of a trait (Section 4). Nevertheless, as we have seen, those causal contributions 
remain perfectly well defined, and that is what matters. 
 
More generally, because innateness is a relativized affair, the very same trait may come out as 
highly innate in some explanatory contexts and highly acquired in others. The deeper picture is 
that traits are the result of both innate and environmental influences, which may interact in 
complex ways, yet our account provides objective measures of both. Sometimes we focus on 
innate contributions to a trait and ignore environmental contributions, other times the reverse. 
Innateness is a useful guide to outcomes of salient interventions, and such a guide must 
inevitably be contextualized as per our account – the connection to causation makes this 
inevitable. The specter of a single trait being ‘both innate and acquired’ is perhaps a hangover of 
a misplaced essentialism – in this case that a trait can have a fixed and absolute property of being 
one or the other.
16
 
                                                          
15
 Mameli and Bateson take lack of learning to be essential to innateness and therefore the hypothetical bird example 
to undercut any account of it. But lack of learning is not essential to innateness for at least two reasons. First, lack of 
learning is insufficient for innateness, as any non-mental acquired trait attests (e.g., scars). Second, learning itself is 
a range of complex processes that result from the interaction between innate and environmental causes. For a more 
detailed critique of defining ‘innate’ as not learned, see Garson 2015, Section 4.2. 
16
 In principle, one could formulate counterfactuals that vary IFOs and environment simultaneously in such a way as 
to render no clear innateness verdict. In practice though, such ‘combined’ counterfactuals do not seem to be salient 
in actual disputes. Indeed, this anti-combined point seems to be true generally (van Fraassen 1980, 126). Even if 
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Perhaps biological influences on human behavior have been greatly exaggerated compared to the 
influences of society and culture, and the one thing that is strongly characteristic of all humans is 
their developmental plasticity (Sterelny 2012)? If so, many human traits are innate to a lesser 
degree than often supposed. But precisely this conclusion would be automatically tracked by our 
account. (Meanwhile, the plasticity itself would be innate because it is insensitive to salient 
environmental changes, even while other traits – namely the plastic ones – are acquired.) 
 
 
8. Against Innateness Skepticism II  
We now turn to two lines of criticism that we consider more challenging. The first, mentioned 
already, is that the term innateness comes with too much baggage. In particular, it taps into 
essentialist intuitions that arguably are part of a deep-rooted ‘folk biology’. Any proposed 
account inevitably invites more confusion than it is worth, in particular by conflating several 
distinct biological phenomena (Griffiths 2002, Mameli & Bateson 2006). 
 
The second line of criticism begins with the thought that an account of innateness should 
elucidate scientific practice. For example, Ariew’s account of innateness as environmental 
canalization was originally (1996) motivated by the wish to make sense of the nativist 
assumption common in cognitive psychology. By fleshing out what that assumption could 
amount to biologically, it elucidates the nativist framing of scientific arguments such as 
Chomsky’s poverty of the stimulus. On the other side, Griffiths and others’ skepticism is 
motivated in part by a different area of science, namely the findings in developmental biology 
that environmental cues are ubiquitous in the development even of traits often labeled innate 
(Griffiths 2009). In contrast to these two examples, our own account of innateness is ‘thin’, 
having no richer connection to scientific practice than the partition of a trait’s causes into IFOs 
and environment. When declaring a trait innate, it appeals to the values of contextually salient 
counterfactuals and associated interventions, but it does not explain those values. 
 
In reply to the first line of criticism: formally, our account does not conflate anything. Rather, in 
this respect its thinness is a virtue, enabling it to judge innateness without commitment to any 
underlying biological mechanisms. Nevertheless, that does leave the risk of inheriting mistaken 
essentialist attitudes. Our reply is twofold: that any mistaken essentialist attitudes should be 
filtered out, as even non-scientists can do (Knobe and Samuels 2013); and that retaining 
innateness also brings with it compensating benefits. We think the latter is the appropriate reply 
to the second line of criticism too—it is beneficial to define innateness in a way that abstracts 
from any particular scientific practice. 
 
The heart of our case is that innateness is a useful umbrella term. This line of defense is standard 
for any macro-property that is multiply realizable, such as ‘money’ or ‘erosion’. According to 
our account, the common theme to innateness ascriptions is an assertion of sensitivity to a 
contextually salient change of IFO and insensitivity to a contextually salient change of 
environment, but what change is salient may vary greatly and the mechanisms explaining the 
sensitivity and insensitivity may similarly vary greatly. For many purposes, it is useful to abstract 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
such a counterfactual ever were salient, our deeper defense of the innateness concept is merely that it is useful 
frequently and that claim would survive occasional odd cases where it isn’t. 
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away from the causal details. Analogous remarks apply to money, erosion and the rest (cf. Maley 
and Piccinini 2014, Boone and Piccinini 2016).
17
 
 
Precisely because the value of the innateness concept lies in abstracting away from specific 
biological mechanisms, it would be a mistake to replace it by referring instead each time to one 
of those specific mechanisms, any more than always referring specifically to coins, bank 
transfers, conch shells and so on would usefully replace the concept of money. Nor, therefore, is 
it a problem if innateness conflates its different particular instantiations, any more than doing so 
is a problem for money or erosion.
18
 
 
Our account abandons any absolute, context-free division of traits into innate and acquired. 
Judgments of innateness and acquiredness are relativized to the salient range of IFOs and 
environments for a population or individual. As we saw, this tracks our judgments of innateness 
well, and certainly better than do other proposed accounts. The same contextualism is true of 
umbrella terms generally – thus conch shells, for instance, will count as money in some contexts 
but not in others. The value of an umbrella term is in part precisely this flexibility. Indeed, 
arguably such flexibility is implied by any causal account, given the sensitivity of all causal 
claims to contextual considerations (Northcott 2008b, Schaffer 2005).
 
 
 
Such causal claims are perfectly objective, notwithstanding their contextual relativization. They 
also allow for elision – and so does innateness. That is, we may without cost often speak as if 
causal (and therefore innateness) claims were not contextually relativized because the salient 
contrasts, background conditions and so on are obvious. It is only when they are not obvious that 
explicit relativization is required (Northcott 2012a, 2008b, Schaffer 2005). 
 
Much of the innateness debate within philosophy has focused on psychology and biology. Yet 
research in the behavioral sciences often presupposes the possibility of generalizations over all or 
almost all humans – this is the case in many areas of anthropology, psychology, economics, 
sociology, and history (Kronfeldner et al 2014). There are also examples from animal training, 
biological anthropology, education theory, transhumanism, and other fields.
19,20
 Such 
generalizations over humans are often assumed to be relatively immune to environmental 
                                                          
17
 We are not committed to innateness being a natural kind term – any more than money or erosion are. This defuses 
Mameli and Bateson’s objection (e.g. 2011) that innateness is not a ‘cluster’ term, therefore (following Boyd) cannot 
be a natural kind term, and therefore should be eliminated from scientific use. Whether or not innateness is a natural 
kind, it is a useful one. It also defuses Mameli and Bateson’s counterexample of ‘jade’. As they point out, jade was 
erroneously supposed to be a single chemical kind before being discovered to include two different such kinds, 
namely jadeite and nephrite. But the issue should be whether ‘jade’ is a useful umbrella term, not whether it is a 
natural kind. (Although we have no particular commitment regarding ‘jade’, we note that jewelers at least still find it 
a useful term.) 
18
 Sometimes our interest might be in the underlying mechanisms themselves, in which case indeed one will want to 
delve deeper than an invocation of innateness. But even then our account’s thinness is an advantage, since it enables 
it to stay agnostic about these separate investigations. Indeed, in many cases the underlying mechanisms are 
unknown – but the relevant environmental insensitivity is still valuable knowledge. 
19
 Moreover, several recent strands in ethics also appeal to the notion of an innate human nature (Hursthouse 1999, 
Foot 2001, also Buchanan 2011 regarding human enhancement). 
20
 Perhaps the division between IFOs and environment is also sometimes useful indirectly (Pinker 2004, 14-17). 
Waters (2007, although see Northcott 2009) and Stegmann (2014) argue that a focus on genetic causation is justified 
by several of its formal properties. 
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intervention, and thus the traits they identify are naturally labeled ‘innate’ in our sense. Often, we 
are not interested in the specific underlying mechanisms, thus favoring our thin, abstract account. 
Moreover, the generalizations frequently play an explanatory role, thus linking them (at least in 
many cases) closely to causation.  
 
Mameli and Bateson themselves mention the example of immunology. This science routinely 
distinguishes between the innate and acquired components of the immune system. The innate 
component provides immediate defense against infection, utilizing mechanisms that work in a 
non-specific way; the acquired (or ‘adaptive’) component develops and changes in response to 
specific past infections, as when one acquires immunity to a virus after having caught it once.
21
 
The ‘innate’ label here has a clear meaning readily understood by all. It highlights that the 
relevant distinction is similar to that recurring in many other areas (thereby also aiding 
comprehension), and it both accurately describes an organism’s medical history and accurately 
guides future interventions. All is in accordance with our account. As is often the case, the 
invocation of innateness is not only unobjectionable, it is positively helpful.
22
 
 
The innate/acquired distinction is ubiquitous in medicine more generally. It is central to, for 
instance, the analysis of different vulnerabilities of different groups – thus the tailoring of 
treatments for particular age cohorts, sexes, ethnicities, and bearers of particular genes. It is 
useful to know which vulnerabilities can reasonably be inferred (even if only statistically) for a 
particular patient based on their innate dispositions, and which cannot. What unites these 
inferences is not the specific mechanisms involved, which indeed sometimes are unknown, but 
rather the more abstract similarity captured by the concept of innateness. 
 
Several other umbrella terms in medicine perform similar roles and are useful for similar 
reasons. One familiar example is ‘fatal’: this is easy to define and is usefully applied to a wide 
range of situations. It would be perverse to eliminate the term or to insist on disaggregating it. 
Yet it shares the same alleged weaknesses as innateness: it abstracts over a large range of 
mechanisms; the very same injury or condition may or may not be fatal depending on context; it 
is arguably associated with misleading folk notions such as fate or destiny that ignore sensitivity 
to environmental inputs (e.g. an open wound need not itself be fatal until infected and left 
untreated); and it may not be a natural kind. Moreover, it carries a new imprecision of its own, 
namely the exact probability of death required for a condition to qualify. Still, despite all of this 
it remains frequently useful to know whether a condition is fatal. As with ‘fatal’, so with 
‘innate’. 
 
 
9. Conclusion 
Innateness remains a ubiquitous notion within many sciences because it usefully tracks and 
predicts which interventions affect trait development. Accordingly, we propose to explicate it as 
follows: factors that are intrinsic to organisms when they originate are innate; other traits are 
innate to the degree they are caused by factors intrinsic at origin. And factors that are extrinsic to 
                                                          
21
 Mameli and Bateson are concerned that even the adaptive component of the immune system features no learning 
in the psychological sense (2011, 437). We agree that it doesn’t – but this is no barrier to declaring it non-innate. 
The example again tells only against defining innateness (in our view mistakenly) in terms of absence of learning. 
22
 O’Neill (2015, 219) discusses several other examples where innateness is useful to scientific practice. 
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organisms are environmental; traits are acquired to the degree they are caused by environmental 
factors. 
 
Skeptics argue that usages of ‘innate’ in the sciences are mistaken and the concept should be 
eliminated. They point to some debates within evolutionary and developmental biology where 
some scientists find it unhelpful. But we should not be parochial or imperialistic: debates among 
some scientists should not automatically trump the practices of many others. It behooves us to 
give an adequate account of innateness if at all possible – one that licenses the relevant claims 
about interventions without any troublesome commitments to particular mechanisms or histories. 
A contextual-causal account does the job.  
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